This paper studies the optimality of securitized debt when information acquisition is endogenous and exible. A seller designs an asset backed security and a buyer decides whether to buy it to provide liquidity. Rather than treating the seller as an insider endowed with information, we assume no information asymmetry before bargaining. The buyer has an expertise in acquiring information of the fundamental in the manner of rational inattention. She collects the most relevant information determined by the "shape" of the security, which may endogenously generate adverse selection. Hence, the seller deliberately designs the security in order to induce the buyer to acquire information least harmful to the seller's interest. Issuing securitized debt is uniquely optimal in raising liquidity, regardless of the stochastic interdependence of underlying assets and the allocation of bargaining powers. Fixed aggregate risk and homogeneous information cost are the key factors driving the results. JEL: D86, D82, G32
securitization process as described above. Much of this literature models sellers as "insiders" who are endowed with private information about the assets, which makes potential buyers hesitate to provide liquidity due to adverse selection. In overcoming such adverse selection, this literature considers the possibility of signaling by sellers, where buyers are passive because they cannot acquire any information about the assets. Also, various assumptions on information, assets and feasible securities to be designed are imposed in these models, which lead to various conclusions on the optimality of different forms of securities.
This paper explores another perspective to look into the problem of adverse selection, which is universal in liquidity provision. Rather than assuming exogenous private information, we consider adverse selection resulted from information acquisition. Speci cally, in our benchmark model, the buyer can acquire information about the assets according to the security proposed by the seller, which endogenously generates adverse selection different from that in the security design literature. 1 We follow (Tri Vi Dang, Gary Gorton and Bengt Holmstrom 2010) in treating the buyer as an "expert" who acquires information accordingly. In reality, buyers involved in ABS transactions are skillful and sophisticated. Their expertise in assessing investment opportunities is better modeled by endogenous information acquisition rather than exogenous information endowment. Here endogeneity means that the agents can choose from a set of information structures according to their investment opportunities. Taking this endogeneity into account, sellers design securities generating least incentive for buyers to acquire information. (Dang, Gorton and Holmstrom 2010) model such information acquisition through the costly state veri cation approach, in which buyers either acquire a speci c signal about the future cash ows of assets or do not acquire any information. In other words, the buyer can only choose from two speci c information structures. Based on this rigid information acquisition process, (Dang, Gorton and Holmstrom 2010) show that debt is the least information-sensitive and thus is an optimal contract to provide liquidity. However, there also exist in nitely many other securities, which are called "quasi-debts", as information-sensitive as the standard debt contract. Also, it is identi ed that some restrictive conditions are required in order to ensure the optimality of these quasi-debts when pooling is considered. As we discuss below, their non-uniqueness result stems from the rigidity of information acquisition inhabits the costly state veri cation approach. This paper differs from (Dang, Gorton and Holmstrom 2010) by allowing for exible information acquisition, which helps achieve the unique optimality of securitized debt, even if pooling of various assets is taken into account. Similar to (Dang, Gorton and Holmstrom 2010) , we assume no information asymmetry at the beginning to focus on the adverse selection resulting from endogenous information acquisition. Given the security backed by the cash ows and its associated price proposed by the seller, exibility enables the buyer to acquire information accordingly about the underlying assets. Here, speci cally, exibility means that the set of feasible information structures to be acquired by the buyer consists of all conditional distributions of signals on the underlying cash ows. It captures the ability of the buyer to allocate her attention in whatever way she wants. Hence, the buyer chooses not only the quantitative but also the qualitative nature of her information.
We model exible information acquisition through the paradigm of rational inattention building upon (Christopher A. Sims 2003) , where any information structure can be acquired at a cost proportional to reduction of entropy. This cost could result from the required time or resource to run models, do statistical tests or write reports. Flexibility enables the buyer to acquire payoff-relevant information accordingly, and the information cost requires her to optimally acquire such information in both quantitative and qualitative aspects. For example, to assess a collateralized debt with face value $1000 and price $800, a potential buyer would like to analyze data more carefully to see when the underlying cash ow possibly varies around $800, but put less attention to check whether the cash ow could reach $2000 or not, since any realization of the underlying cash ow that is above the face value always generates $1000 to the buyer. Similar to (Dang, Gorton and Holmstrom 2010) , standard securitized debt is optimal for liquidity provision in our model. But our result is sharper in the sense that securitized debt is the uniquely optimal one. In (Dang, Gorton and Holmstrom 2010) , only two extreme information structures are available in the setup of costly state veri cation but in nite forms of securities can be designed, which inevitably results in the indistinguishability of some securities. In our framework, with help of exibility, the variety of available information structures matches the variety of potential securities to be designed, and thus the uniqueness of the standard securitized debt could be guaranteed. Quasi-debts are no longer optimal in our model. By reshaping the uneven tail above the price of a quasidebt to a at one, not only the buyer's information cost could be saved but also potential loss of trade from adverse selection could be mitigated. The resulted surplus could be employed by the seller to make both parties better off, and thus ultimately make a better provision of liquidity possible. Moreover, exible information acquisition provides a uni ed framework to analyze securitization of multiple assets. We show that pooling and issuing securitized debt is uniquely optimal to raise liquidity, regardless of the stochastic interdependence among the underlying assets and the allocation of bargaining power.
There are two key factors determining the unique optimality of standard securitized debt. The rst one is the xed aggregate risk implicitly speci ed in the benchmark trading game in the sense that the total cash ows owned by the seller and buyer are invariant with respect to the success or failure of the transaction. As the aggregate risk is xed, information acquisition is not socially valuable. Acquiring information is no more than waste of money when both parties are considered as a unity. Moreover, this trading game with xed aggregate risk leads to con icting interests of the two parties, so that the information acquired by the buyer makes herself better off but at the expense of the seller through adverse selection, which further reduces the potential gain from trade. Since the buyer's incentive to acquire information is shaped by the offer proposed to her, the seller deliberately designs the ABS to optimally discourage information acquisition harmful to her own interests. Due to the limited liability, any feasible ABS is bounded above by the sum of underlying cash ows. When information cost is not too high, the exibility allows the buyer to distinguish between any states with different payoffs. Hence the seller makes the ABS a constant whenever it is off the boundary to discourage information acquisition and thus mitigate adverse selection. This consideration gives rise to a at tail. In states where the underlying cash ows are too low to support such constant, the ABS reaches the boundary and equals the sum of underlying cash ows. Therefore, the at tail and the boundary component constitute a securitized debt, which is uniquely optimal for liquidity provision. We also use an example with variable aggregate risk to illustrate the importance of xed aggregate risk in our framework. Consider the seller as an entrepreneur that raises funds from the buyer to take a project with uncertain future cash ows. They jointly expose themselves to an aggregate risk if the buyer accepts the offer, and are not exposed to such risk if the offer is rejected. In this case, information acquisition could be socially valuable and the con icting interests of the two parties could be partly reconciled. Therefore, the seller could deliberately design a contract to encourage the buyer to acquire information that helps avoid investing in states where cash ows are too low. This increases her bene t from the trade, and also leads to a more socially desirable outcome.
Another key factor is the homogeneity in information acquisition. That is, no state is more special than other states in terms of the dif culty of information acquisition. This feature stems from rational inattention 2 and is the reason why our qualitative result does not depend on the stochastic interdependence among the underlying assets. Intuitively, if information about some assets is much easier to acquire than other assets, the at part of the securitized debt cannot be preserved in the optimal ABS. We provide an example that illustrates this idea. The above two factors specify the boundary of our theory.
Finally, the origin of the uniqueness of optimal contract is not only from the exibility itself, but from the double-sided symmetry of exibility. In principle, general exible choice, not necessarily restricted to exible information acquisition, enables an economic agent to make state-contingent responses. In other words, the agent can make a best response in one state, and can make another best response in another state. Doublesided symmetry of exibility requires that both parties engaged in a potential trade are endowed with the same level of exibility.
How this double-sided symmetry of exibility works can be seen by comparing our framework to (Dang, Gorton and Holmstrom 2010) and the traditional models of costly state veri cation like (Robert M. Townsend 1979) . In all these three models, the contract designer is endowed with exibility, in the sense that she can assign state-contingent repayment through designing any form of security. What matters to shape the different results regarding uniqueness of the optimal contract relies on the potential exibility of the other party who decides whether to accept the offer. In our framework, ex-ante symmetric information in the form of a double-sided ignorance prevents the buyer to make a state-contingent choice if she only follows the traditional costly state veri cation approach to acquire information. However, the buyer in our framework is able to choose state-contingent probability of accepting the offer, namely, she can perform exible in-formation acquisition. In this sense the buyer enjoys the same level of exibility as the seller. Given this double-sided symmetry of exibility in our model, the uniqueness of an optimal contract, which is the standard securitized debt, is guaranteed. In (Dang, Gorton and Holmstrom 2010) , however, the buyer can only follow the traditional costly state veri cation approach to acquire information, in which only two options, namely, to acquire a signal or not, are available. In other words, the buyer in (Dang, Gorton and Holmstrom 2010) cannot make state-contingent decision. Hence, the desired doublesided symmetry of exibility fails and the uniqueness of the optimal contract fails as a consequence. Interestingly, (Townsend 1979 ) also employs the costly state veri cation approach with two options to model information acquisition, namely, to audit or not, but the unique optimality of a standard debt still emerges. Why it is this case? Different from (Dang, Gorton and Holmstrom 2010) and our framework, in (Townsend 1979 ) the entrepreneur has information advantage over the lender in the sense that the entrepreneur knows the realized pro t of the project which the lender does not know. Thanks to the revelation principle, the lender who acquire information in the interim stage can decide whether to audit or not in any state based on the truth told by the entrepreneur who has private information. In other words, although the lender in (Townsend 1979) still only has two options to acquire information as the buyer in (Dang, Gorton and Holmstrom 2010) , such two options in (Townsend 1979 ) are state-contingent while their counterparts in (Dang, Gorton and Holmstrom 2010) are not. Therefore, the double-sided symmetry of exibility is still established in (Townsend 1979) , and the uniqueness of the optimal contract, also a standard debt, is ensured in their model as well.
We proceed as following. Section II studies exible information acquisition in a binary choice problem, which provides a solid foundation for analyzing players' behavior in the trading game and liquidity provision. Section III derives the uniquely optimal contract as the securitized debt in various circumstances and identi es the two key driving forces of this result. We conclude and discuss in Section IV.
Relation to Literature. We model players' information acquisition behavior through the framework of rational inattention building on (Christopher A. Sims 1998) and (Sims 2003) . 3 In applied work, rational inattention is mainly studied in two cases: the linearquadratic case (e.g., (Bartosz Mackowiak and Mirko Wiederholt 2009)) , and the binaryaction case. A leading example of the latter is (Michael Woodford 2009) , where rms acquire information and then decide whether to review their prices. Similar to (Ming Yang 2011), this paper also adopts the binary-action setup in a strategic framework, which is different from the single-person decision problem as employed in (Woodford 2009 ). Compared to (Yang 2011) where both players acquire information and move simultaneously, this paper considers a case in which players move sequentially, and only one party acquires information that results in information asymmetry. Also, this paper focuses on a speci c security design problem, rather than addresses a general coordina-tion game as (Yang 2011). Together with (Yang 2011), our work makes early attempts to incorporate rational inattention based exible information acquisition into strategic problems and offers various new results different from this trend of rational inattention literature.
This paper is also closely related to the security design literature, in much of which sellers are modeled as "insiders" exogenously endowed with private information. Sellers' information advantage over buyers results in adverse selection which further leads to inef cient trade. In order to deal with the adverse selection problem given that buyers cannot acquire information, sellers want to signal their private information out in order to partly retrieve ef cient trade. In this process, appropriate security design matters. This is because signaling is costly, so that to design a security that is less information sensitive than the original asset could save the signaling cost, which in turn adds to the pro t of sellers. This consideration is plausible and insightful results have been well established in literature, but there may also be other interesting possibilities worth investigating. Also, various assumptions are imposed in this literature to deliver various results. In our paper, buyers in nancial markets may also actively acquire information, which could result in different interplay between the two parties and different results of security design, and we can get clearer results from a single assumption.
The key difference between our approach and much of the security design literature could be clearly seen in discussing some of their assumptions and results in details. (Gary Gorton and George G. Pennacchi 1990) shows that splitting assets into debt and equity mitigates the lemon problem between outsiders and insiders. They directly assume the existence of debt rather than considering a security design problem. In (Peter M. DeMarzo and Darrell Duf e 1999), informed sellers signal the quality of assets to competitive liquidity suppliers through retaining part of the cash ows. Equity is issued when the contractible information is not very sensitive to sellers' private information. Standard debt is optimal within the set of non-decreasing securities if the information structure allows a uniform worst case. (Bruno Biais and Thomas Mariotti 2005) studies the effects of market power on market liquidity. They derive both the optimal security and trading mechanism through the approach of mechanism design. Debt contract turns out to be optimal under distributional conditions of underlying cash ows. (Peter M. DeMarzo 2005) focuses on the consequences of pooling and tranching. Pooling has an information destruction effect that destroys the seller's ability to signal the quality of her assets separately. When tranching is possible, pooling may also have a risk diversi cation effect that reduces information sensitivity of the senior claim. Under speci c distributional assumptions of the noise structure, (DeMarzo 2005) shows that the risk diversi cation effect dominates the information destruction effect as the number of underlying assets goes to in nity. In this limit case, pooling and tranching become optimal. These models also restrict their attention to non-decreasing securities 4 . (Robert D. Innes 1990) provides a standard motivation for this constraint. When the security is not monotone, a seller may cheat through borrowing from a third party, reporting a high cash ow to reduce her repayment and then repaying the side loan. The validity of this argument depends on the context. In the case of publicly traded stocks or bonds, this kind of cheat is unlikely to happen because it is dif cult or even illegal for seller to manipulate the cash ows. Moreover, when the security is written on multiple underlying assets, even the concept of monotonicity is not well de ned. Our framework is free of these limits.
II. Binary Choice with Endogenous and Flexible Information Acquisition
Before introducing the economic environment of security design problem, we review the logic of binary choice with exible information acquisition, which will play a key role in the following analysis. The readers mainly interested in the security design problem can skip this section and go back to it when needed.
In our leading example, a buyer faces a take-it-or-leave-it offer. She has to acquire information and then make a binary choice. We rst focus on information structures with binary signals and then show that it suf ces to do so.
A. Decision Problem
Consider an agent who has to choose an action a 2 f0; 1g and will receive a payoff u .a; /, where 2 2 R is an unknown state distributed according to a continuous probability measure P over 2.
The agent has access to the set of binary-signal information structures. In particular, she observes signals x 2 f0; 1g parameterized by measurable function m : 2 ! [0; 1], where m . / is the probability of observing signal 1 if the true state is (and so 1 m . / is the probability of observing signal 0). The conditional probability function m . / describes the agent's information acquisition strategy. By choosing different functional forms for m . /, the agent can make her signal covary with fundamental in any way she would like. Intuitively, if her welfare is sensitive to uctuation of the state within some range A 2, she would pay much attention to this event by letting m . / be highly sensitive to 2 A. In this sense, choosing an information structure can be interpreted as hiring an analyst to write a report with emphasis on your interests. This idea will be made more clear through an example later in this section.
QUANTITY AND COST OF INFORMATION
Following (Sims 2003) , we measure the quantity of information according to information theory building on (Claude E. Shannon 1948) . Information conveyed by an information structure m . / is de ned as the expected reduction of uncertainty through observing signals generated by m . /, where the uncertainty associated with a distribution is measured by Shannon's entropy.
Before observing her signal, the agent's uncertainty about is given by Shannon's entropy of her prior
where p is the density function of prior P 6 . After observing signal 1, the agent forms a posterior of
and her posterior uncertainty upon receiving signal 1 is measured by her posterior entropy
Similarly, observing signal 0 leads to a posterior
and posterior entropy
Then the agent's expected posterior entropy through choosing information structure m . / is
Let I .m/ denote the quantity of information gained through m . /, which equals the 5 This is essentially the unique measure of uncertainty given three axioms. See (Thomas M. Cover and Joy A. Thomas 1991) for detailed discussion.
6 Following the convention of information theory, we let 0 ln 0 D 0. This is reasonable since lim
difference between the agent's prior entropy and expected posterior entropy, i.e.,
where
In information theory, I .m/ is called mutual information. It measures the quantity of information about that is conveyed by the signal.
for the set of binary-signal information structures. Let c : M ! R C be the cost (in terms of utility) of acquiring information. We assume that the cost is proportional to the quantity of information gained, i.e.,
where > 0 is the marginal cost of information acquisition. It measures the dif culty in acquiring information. When D 0, information acquisition incurs no cost and the agent can directly observe the true state. When ! 1, the agent cannot acquire any information at all.
It is worth noting that mutual information I .m/ measures function m's variability, which re ects the informativeness of actions to the fundamental. For example, when m . / is constant, the actions convey no information about and the corresponding mutual information is zero. This is because function g is strictly convex and thus I .m/ is zero if and only if m . / is constant. Hence, a nice property of our technology of information acquisition is that there exists information acquisition if and only if m . / varies over , if and only if information cost is positive. Also note that the "shape" (functional form) of m determines not only the quantity but also the qualitative nature of information. For instance, an agent can concentrate her attention to some event through making m . / highly sensitive to within such event. In this sense, our technology of information acquisition is exible since the agent can decide both the quantity and quality of their information through freely choosing from M. It is also worth noting that c . / is convex, i.e.,
for all m 1 ; m 2 2 M and t 2 [0; 1]. This convexity is strict when at least one of m 1 and m 2 is not a constant in .
SOLVING BINARY DECISION PROBLEM WITH INFORMATION ACQUISITION
Now we are interested in the problem of an agent choosing an information structure m 2 M and a stochastic decision rule f : f0; 1g ! [0; 1] to maximize her expected utility (3)
Without loss of generality, we can let f D f where f .1/ D 1 and f .0/ D 0. This simpli cation is based on the following observation. If we let
This is because the rst term of (3) remains the same, while the information cost becomes smaller due to the convexity of c . /.
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Fixing f D f , we can interpret m as a joint information structure and decision rule specifying that the agent will take action 1 with probability m . / in state . Now the agent's problem is to choose m 2 M to maximize
/ is a constant that does not depend on m, we can rede ne the agent's objective as
Thus at least one of f .1/ and is strictly less than 1:Then
is the payoff gain from taking action 1 over action 0. It shapes the agent's incentive of information acquisition.
The following lemma characterizes the optimal strategy m for the agent.
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PROPOSITION 1: 9 Let Pr .1u . / 6 D 0/ > 0 to exclude the trivial case that the agent is always indifferent between the two actions. Let m 2 M be an optimal strategy and
be the corresponding unconditional probability of taking action 1. Then, i) the optimal strategy is unique; ii) there are three possibilities for the optimal strategy: a) p 1 D 1 (i.e., m . / D 1 almost surely) if and only if
in this case, the optimal strategy m is characterized by
for all 2 2, where
PROOF: See Appendix A. These results are intuitive. Since the information cost is convex, the agent's objective is concave, which gives rise to the uniqueness of the optimal strategy.
In case a), condition (4) holds if action 1 is very likely the ex ante best action and the cost of acquiring information is suf ciently high. Hence the agent just takes action 1 without acquiring any information. Similarly, case b) implies that if action 0 is ex ante very likely to dominate action 1 and the information cost is suf ciently high, the agent always takes action 0. In this two cases, marginal bene t of acquiring information is less than the marginal cost. Hence the decision maker chooses not to acquire any information.
In case c), as captured by the two inequalities, neither action 1 nor action 0 is ex ante dominant, thus there is information acquisition and m . / is no longer a constant.
In order to get some intuition, consider an extreme case where action 1 is dominant, i.e., the payoff gain 1u . / > 0 almost surely. It is obvious that the agent will always take action 1 regardless of , the marginal cost of information acquisition.
When neither action is dominant, i.e.,
Pr .1u . / > 0/ > 0 and Pr .1u . / < 0/ > 0 , the marginal cost of information acquisition plays a role. On the one hand,
Hence Proposition 1 predicts that no information is acquired if is high enough. On the other hand, since
we have lim
A similar argument leads to
Therefore, Proposition 1 reads that there must exist information acquisition if the mar-ginal cost of information is suf ciently low. This interpretation coincides with our intuition that the agent rationally decides whether to acquire information through comparing the cost to the bene t of information acquisition. When neither action is dominant and the marginal cost of information acquisition takes intermediate values, the agent nds it optimal to acquire some information to make her action (partially, in a random manner) contingent on . This is the case speci ed by condition (6). Since g 0 is strictly increasing, (7) implies that m . /, the conditional probability of choosing action 1, is increasing with respect to payoff gain 1u . /. This is intuitive. The left hand side of (7) represents the marginal bene t of increasing m . /, while the right hand side of (7) is the marginal cost of information when increasing m . /. Therefore, if deciding to acquire information, the agent will equate her marginal bene t with her marginal cost of doing so.
AN EXAMPLE
The following example provides some intuition behind the agent's information acquisition strategy.
Let distribute according to N .t; 1/ and
It is easy to verify that the agent always chooses action 1 (action 0) if and only if t 1 =2 (t 1 =2). In this case, action 1 (action 0) is superior to action 0 (action 1) ex ante (i.e., jtj is large) and the cost in acquiring information is relatively high (i.e., is large). Hence it is not worth acquiring any information at all. Let t D 0, then the agent nds it optimal to acquire some information. According to (7), the optimal information acquisition strategy m . / satis es
Since prior N .0; 1/ is symmetric about the origin and payoff gain 1u . / is an odd function, the agent is indifferent on average, i.e., Z
Therefore,
First note that
Step function a . / captures the agent's choice under complete information. In this case, the agent can observe the exact value of . When > 0, the best response is characterized by (9). Since information is no longer free, the agent has to allow some mistake in her response. The conditional probability of mistake is given by
which is decreasing in j j, the "price" of mistake. Therefore, the agent deliberately acquires information to balance the price of mistake and the cost of information. Second, parameter measures the dif culty in acquiring information. Figure 1 shows how m . / varies with this parameter.
When D 0, information acquisition incurs no cost and the agent's response is a step function. She never makes mistake. When becomes larger, she starts to compromise the accuracy of her decision to save information cost. Larger leads to atter m . /. Finally, when is extremely large, m . / is almost constant and the agent almost stops acquiring information.
Third, since the agent's action is highly sensitive to where slope
re ects her attentiveness around . Under this interpretation, Figure 1 reveals that the agent actively collects information for intermediate values of the fundamental but is rationally inattentive to values at the tails. This result coincides with our intuition. When is too high (low), the agent should take action 1 (action 0) anyway. Hence the information about on the tails are not so relevant to her payoff. When takes intermediate values, the agent's payoff gain from taking action 1 over action 0 depends crucially on the sign of . Therefore, the information about around zero is payoffrelevant and attracts most of her attention.
We have been focusing on binary-signal information structures. Next subsection justies this setup.
B. Justifying the Binary-signal Information Structure
Generally, an agent can purchase any information structure ..X; / ; /. Here X is the set of realizations of the signal, is a -algebra on X , and 8 2 2, . j / is a probability measure on X . . j / conveys information about state in the sense that for any event A X , .Aj / speci es the conditional probability of A given . Before making a decision, the agent can acquire information about the state in the form of an information structure. An information structure speci es both the quantity and qualitative nature The binary-signal information structure analyzed above is a special case with X D f0; 1g and .1j / D m . / (and so .0j / D 1 m . /). For binary choice problem with exible information acquisition, it suf ces to restrict our attention to this special class of information structures. To see this, let ..X; / ; / be any information structure chosen by the agent. Given ..X; / ; /, the agent optimally chooses her action rule as a : X ! [0; 1], where a .x/ is the probability of taking action 1 upon receiving signal x. Let
and X ind D fx 2 X : a .x/ 2 .0; 1/g : X 1 (X 0 ) is the set of signal realizations such that the agent de nitely takes action 1 (0). She is indifferent when her signal belongs to X ind . Then .X 1 ; X 0 ; X ind / forms a partition of X . Since the only use of the signal is to make a binary decision, a signal differentiating more nely among the states just conveys redundant information and wastes the agent's attention. Hence the agent will not discern signal realizations within any of X 1 , X 0 and X ind . In addition, because she is indifferent between action 0 and 1 upon event X ind , she would rationally pay no attention to distinguish this event from other realizations. Hence, the agent always play pure strategies upon receiving her signal. Therefore, the agent always prefers binary-signal information structures.
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III. Security Design with Information Acquisition
A. Basic Setup
We consider a two-period game with two players. One player is a seller that owns N assets at period 0. These assets generate veri able random cash ows
11 . The other player is a potential buyer holding consumption goods (money) at period 0. Player i's utility function is given by
where c it denotes player i's consumption at period t and i 2 [0; 1] is her subjective discount factor, i 2 fs; bg(fs; bg stands for fseller; buyer g). We assume b > s to represent that the seller has a better investment opportunity than the buyer. This assumption creates the trading demand. Both agents may bene t from transferring some goods to the seller at date 0 and compensating the buyer with repayment backed by the random cash ows ! at date 1.
Similar to (Dang, Gorton and Holmstrom 2010) , we assume no information asymmetry at period 0 to focus on the adverse selection resulting from endogenous information acquisition. Hence the two agents start with identical information about ! , which is represented by a full support common prior P over 2. Without loss of generality, we assume that P is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue's measure on R N C . A security backed by ! , the cash ows of the N assets, is a mapping s :
. A contract .s . / ; q/ is a security s . / associated with a price q > 0. Throughout the paper, we focus on the case where one player proposes a take-it-or-leave-it contract .s . / ; q/ to her opponent, who then acquires information and decides whether to accept it. This setup captures the idea that some agents in the markets of securitized assets are less sophisticated than others and cannot produce private information about the underlying cash ows. This separation between bargaining power and ability of information acquisition also makes our problem tractable. 12 10 (Woodford 2009) has a similar argument that the agent only needs to acquire a "yes/no" signal. 11 Here the assumption of veri able cash ows is natural, since we generally have third parties monitor and collect the underlying loans and distribute the cash ows to the holders of asset backed securities. 12 We would have to study a much more complicated signaling game if the issuer can produce private information
We rst study the case where the seller designs the contract and the buyer acquires information. We then highlight two key factors driving the unique optimality of issuing securitized debt. We nally exchange the bargaining power and the ability of information acquisition to show the robustness of our main results.
B. Optimal Contract when the Seller Designs
Consider the particular binary choice problem where the agent is a risk neutral buyer with utility (10). Action 1 corresponds to buying the ABS s ! at price q and action 0 corresponds to not buying. Write m s;q for the buyer's optimal strategy when facing contract .s; q/. Let
be the buyer's unconditional probability of accepting the offer. The seller thus enjoys an expected utility
The seller's problem is to choose a contract .s; q/ satisfying s ! 2 h 0; P N nD1 n i to maximize W .s; q/. Let .s . / ; q / denote the optimal contract and
be the corresponding probability of trade. According to Proposition 1, there are three possible cases: a) p s ;q D 1; b) p s ;q D 0; and c) p s ;q 2 .0; 1/. We rst argue that case b) is impossible.
PROPOSITION 2: p s ;q > 0, i.e., trade happens with positive probability.
PROOF:
We prove by constructing a securitized debt that generates positive expected payoff to the seller. Let 2 s 1 b ; 1 and
before her proposal. In that case, the set of possible signals consists of all contracts, which is a functional space. To the best of our knowledge, this kind of signaling games are rarely studied before. (Peter M. DeMarzo, Ilan Kremer and Andrzej Skrzypacz 2005) does consider a security design problem where potential signals are securities. But their approach does not t our framework of exible information acquisition. In the literature, either the informed agent chooses nite-dimension signals (e.g., the level of debt in (Stephen A. Ross 1977) , the retaining fraction of the equity in (Hayne E Leland and David H Pyle 1977), etc.), or the issuer designs the security before obtaining her information (e.g., (DeMarzo and Duf e 1999), (Biais and Mariotti 2005) ).
Since P is a continuous distribution and
for all q 2 0; q 0 . Hence for any q 2 .0; q 0 /, 
where the last inequality comes from (12). Hence according to Proposition 1, p s;q > 0. Then, the seller's expected payoff from this contract is
By de nition, the seller's expected payoff through the optimal contract is W .s ; q / W .s; q/ > 0. This directly implies p s ;q > 0 since p s ;q D 0 always generates zero expected payoff to the seller. This concludes the proof. The key of the proof is to show that the seller can always enjoy a positive expected payoff through proposing a securitized debt. Hence her optimal contract must also generate a positive expected payoff, which can be achieved only through a successful trade. Although facing adverse selection, the seller always prefers trade. This is because she owns all bargaining power. She is able to minimize the negative effect of information acquisition through appropriately designing a contract and thus enjoy the bene t from trade.
According to Proposition 2, only case a) and c) are possible. In case a) p s ;q D 1 and the buyer does not acquire any information. In case c), p s ;q 2 .0; 1/ and the buyer does acquire some information. We rst study the seller's optimal contract in case a).
OPTIMAL CONTRACT WITHOUT INDUCING INFORMATION ACQUISITION
A direct application of Proposition 1 suggests that any contract .s; q/ that does not induce information acquisition must satisfy
Intuitively, the buyer just accepts the offer when the price is low enough relative to the repayment of the security. This inequality must bind for seller's optimal contract, otherwise she can bene t from increasing the price q. Hence, (13) reduces to
Since the contract is always accepted, the seller's expected payoff becomes
Hence the seller's problem can be formalized as 
PROOF:
See Appendix A.
First note that the face value has a lower bound, i.e.,
Hence if the maximal cash ow
the optimal security is actually the pool of all assets. This could happen when the seller has an extremely good investment opportunity relative to the buyer (i.e., ln b ln s 1) or it is too hard for the buyer to acquire information (i.e., 1). As a direct implication, when the buyer cannot acquire any information (i.e., ! 1), the seller just sells the pool of all assets at price
and enjoys the maximal trading surplus
Another interesting observation comes from equation (14), which implies
where the inequality follows Jensen's inequality. Since the offer induces no information acquisition, both parties remain symmetrically informed and the seller should have charged the buyer b Es ! . However, the seller nds it optimal to charge a lower price q to bribe the buyer not to acquire information. In the rest of this section, we show that securitized debt remains uniquely optimal even if there is information acquisition.
OPTIMAL CONTRACT WITH INFORMATION ACQUISITION
According to Proposition 1, any contract .s . / ; q/ that induces the buyer to acquire information must satisfy
where the expectation is taken according to common prior P. That is, neither accepting nor rejecting the offer is dominant ex ante, and thus the buyer nds it optimal to acquire some information. Given such a contract, Proposition 1 prescribes that the buyer's optimal strategy m s;q is uniquely characterized by
is the buyer's unconditional probability of accepting the offer. Taking into account of the buyer's response m s;q , the seller chooses .s . / ; q/ to maximize her expected payoff (17), (18) and the feasibility condition
It is worth noting that both (16) and (17) should not bind for the optimal contract, otherwise no information will be acquired according to Proposition 1. Hence, conditional on the fact that the optimal contract does induce information acquisition, these two constraints could be ignored during optimization.
We derive the optimal contract .s . / ; q / through calculus of variations. That is, see how the seller's expected payoff responds to the perturbation of her optimal contract.
Let 
PROOF:
See Appendix A. The rst term of the right hand side of (20) is the buyer's local response to " ! . It is of the same sign as the perturbation " ! . When the repayment increases at state ! , the buyer is more likely to accept the offer at this state. The second term measures the buyer's average response to perturbation " ! over all states. It is straightforward to verify that the denominator is positive due to Jensen's inequality. Hence, if on average the perturbation increases her repayment, the buyer would like to accept the offer more often. Now we can calculate the variation of the seller's expected payoff W .s; q /. Taking derivative with respect to at D 0 for both sides of (11) leads to (21)
Substitute (20) into (21) and manipulate we get
Note that w is a constant that does not depend on ! . Its value is endogenously determined in equilibrium. Here r ! is the Frechet derivative 13 of W .s; q / at s , it measures the marginal contribution of any perturbation to the seller's expected payoff. The rst term of (23) is the direct contribution of perturbing s disregarding the variation of m s ;q ! . The second term measures the indirect contribution through the variation of m s ;q ! . This expression represents the chain rule of the calculus of variations.
and
In regions A 0 and A 2 , s . / is bounded by its lower bound and upper bound, respectively. In region A 1 , s . / is off the boundaries. Then fA 0 ; A 1 ; A 2 g is a partition of 2n n ! 0 o . Since s . / is the optimal security,
holds for any feasible 14 perturbation " ! . Hence (22) implies
Since g is strictly convex, g 00 > 0 and (24) can be rewritten as
Recall that given the optimal contract .s . / ; q /, the buyer's best response m s ;q ! is characterized by
is the buyer's unconditional probability of accepting the optimal contract .s . / ; q /. 
Also note that m s ;q ! D f 2 s ! for all ! 2 2. Now we can characterize the optimal security through analyzing f 1 and f 2 together.
See Appendix A. This proposition states that constraint s ! 0 never binds. The logic underlying the proof is that on the boundary s ! D 0, although an increment of s ! increases the seller's repayment, it increases the probability of trading even more. Hence the seller on average gains through deviating from the lower boundary. As its implication, it is not optimal to issue equity residual/call option to raise liquidity. constraint never binds, the seller would issue a security with constant repayment to avoid the buyer's information acquisition. However, once the underlying cash ows are too low to support such constant, s ! reaches the limited liability boundary and equals P N nD1 n . The next proposition shows that the optimal security must be a securitized debt.
PROPOSITION 5: If the seller's optimal contract induces the buyer to acquire information, it must be a securitized debt s ! D min P N nD1 n ; D .
See Appendix A. Together with Proposition 2 and 3, this proposition enables us to conclude that pooling the assets and issuing a senior tranche is always the uniquely optimal way to raise liquidity. Pooling is directly derived from the seller's desire to maximize liquidity. It has nothing to do with the consideration of risk diversi cation since both agents are riskneutral. The at tail of the optimal security results from the seller's effort to minimize her opponent's information acquisition. In contrast to the non-uniqueness result in (Dang, Gorton and Holmstrom 2010) , we can show the unique optimality of debt because of our exible information acquisition framework. In (Dang, Gorton and Holmstrom 2010) , only two extreme information structures are available in the setup of costly state verication while in nite forms of securities can be designed, which inevitably results in the indistinguishability of some securities. In our framework, with help of exibility, the variety of available information structures matches the variety of potential securities to be designed, and thus the uniqueness of the standard securitized debt could be guaranteed. Quasi-debts are no longer optimal in our model. By reshaping the uneven tail above the price of a quasi-debt to a at one, not only the buyer's information cost could be saved but also potential loss of trade from adverse selection could be mitigated. The resulted surplus could be employed by the seller to make both parties better off, and thus ultimately make a better provision of liquidity possible. Moreover, this exibility also enables us to show the optimality of pooling and tranching in a broader class of environments than (Dang, Gorton and Holmstrom 2010) and without assuming a suf ciently large number of underlying assets as in (DeMarzo 2005) 16 . In addition, while most models in literature are built upon speci c assumptions about the cash ows, our qualitative result does not rely on such distributional details of underlying assets. Since the stochastic interdependence among the underlying assets could be complex and violate such assumptions, our model provides a better explanation for the prevalence of securitization in nancial markets.
The security design literature usually assumes Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP) or similar conditions to guarantee a meaningful result. Our framework justi es this assumption through endogenizing the information structure. According to Proposi-tion 5, the optimal security s ! is non-decreasing in the sum of cash ows. Proposition 1 implies that the best information structure m s ;q ! is increasing in the payoff gain b s ! q . Hence m s ;q ! is also non-decreasing in the sum of the cash ows. Therefore, the larger the cash ows, the higher the probability that the buyer gets a signal asking her to accept. This can be interpreted as a generalized MLRP for multi-dimensional states.
To facilitate the analysis, the security design literature usually restrict their attention to the set of "regular" securities, which are non-decreasing in the underlying cash ows (e.g., (DeMarzo and Duf e 1999), (DeMarzo 2005) ). We do not have such restriction, but show that the optimal security naturally turns out to be non-decreasing.
Finally, (Dang, Gorton and Holmstrom 2010) get debt contract uniquely optimal when their xed information cost is zero. This can be viewed as a special case of our model where marginal cost of information acquisition vanishes.
UNDERSTANDING THE ORIGIN OF UNIQUENESS
For readers familiar with the approach of costly state veri cation (CSV), a question naturally arises regarding the uniqueness of the optimal contract. Both (Townsend 1979) and (Dang, Gorton and Holmstrom 2010) employ CSV, why does the former but not the latter get debt uniquely optimal? In last subsection, we have attributed the nonuniqueness in (Dang, Gorton and Holmstrom 2010) to the rigidity of CSV. This argument is correct when comparing (Dang, Gorton and Holmstrom 2010) to our model, but not fully convincing when (Townsend 1979 ) is also considered. To fully understand the different results in (Dang, Gorton and Holmstrom 2010) , (Townsend 1979) and our model, we rst highlight the essence of exibility. In principle, general exible choice, not necessarily restricted to exible information acquisition, enables an economic agent to make state-contingent responses. In other words, the agent can make a best response in one state, and can make another best response in another state. In all these three models, the contract designer is endowed with exibility, in the sense that she can assign statecontingent repayment through designing any form of security. What matters to shape the different results regarding uniqueness of the optimal contract relies on the potential exibility of the other party who decides whether to accept the offer. Through comparing these three models, we argue that the origin of the uniqueness is not only from the exibility itself, but from the double-sided symmetry of exibility. Here, doublesided symmetry of exibility requires that both parties engaged in a potential trade are endowed with the same level of exibility.
In our framework, ex-ante symmetric information in the form of a double-sided ignorance prevents the buyer to make a state-contingent choice if she only follows the traditional CSV approach to acquire information. However, the buyer in our framework is able to choose state-contingent probability (i.e., m ! ) of accepting the offer, namely, she can perform exible information acquisition. In this sense the buyer enjoys the same level of exibility as the seller. Given this double-sided symmetry of exibility in our model, the uniqueness of an optimal contract, which is the standard securitized debt, is guaranteed. In (Dang, Gorton and Holmstrom 2010) , however, the buyer can only follow the traditional CSV approach to acquire information, in which only two options, namely, to acquire a signal or not, are available. Moreover, ex-ante symmetric ignorance precludes the possibility of conditioning the action on any private information. Hence the CSV makes the buyer in (Dang, Gorton and Holmstrom 2010) unable to make state-contingent decision. As a result, the desired double-sided symmetry of exibility fails and the uniqueness of the optimal contract fails as a consequence. Interestingly, (Townsend 1979 ) also employs the costly state veri cation approach with two options to model information acquisition, namely, to audit or not, but the unique optimality of a standard debt still emerges. Why it is this case? Different from (Dang, Gorton and Holmstrom 2010) and our framework, in (Townsend 1979 ) the entrepreneur has information advantage over the lender in the sense that the entrepreneur knows the realized pro t of the project which the lender does not know. Thanks to the revelation principle, the lender who acquire information in the interim stage can decide whether to audit or not in any state based on the truth told by the entrepreneur who has private information. In other words, although the lender in (Townsend 1979 ) still only has two options to acquire information as the buyer in (Dang, Gorton and Holmstrom 2010) , such two options in (Townsend 1979 ) are state-contingent while their counterparts in (Dang, Gorton and Holmstrom 2010) are not. Therefore, the double-sided symmetry of exibility is still established in (Townsend 1979) , and the uniqueness of the optimal contract, also a standard debt, is ensured in their model as well. Figure 2 shows the relation among these three models. This subsection explores the origin of uniqueness of the optimal contract. We address the optimality of securitized debt in next subsection.
TWO KEY FACTORS DRIVING THE OPTIMALITY OF SECURITIZED DEBT
Although our model explains the popularity of securitized debt contracts, it is important to gure out the boundary of our theory. In this subsection, we propose two key factors that drive our results. We show that issuing securitized debt is no longer optimal in absence of these factors.
The rst feature of our model is its xed aggregate risk. Before designing the contract, the seller has already owned assets ! . Hence the assets owned by the seller and the buyer as a whole is invariant with respect to the success or failure of the transaction. This xed aggregate risk leads to con icting interests of the two parties, where any information acquired by the buyer makes herself better off but hurts the seller's bene t through adverse selection. That is, the buyer attempts to acquire information that helps her reject the offer once the repayment is lower than the price and accept the offer in the opposite case. However, whatever quantity and quality of information is acquired has nothing to do with their aggregate risk. The importance of this factor can be seen clearly in our derivation of the optimal security. Since the buyer's incentive to acquire information and the seller's incentive to design the security are totally shaped by their payoff gains from the success over the To make our point more clear, we consider a similar problem with variable aggregate risk. The seller is an entrepreneur who wants to raise capital q to take a project that generates cash ow . The project requires a total investment q, which is nanced by a bank as well as the entrepreneur's own capital. As before, she designs a security s . / and proposes a take-it-or-leave-it offer .s; q/ to the bank, who is the buyer that acquires information in the present problem. The entrepreneur's project gets funded and generates future cash ow only if the bank accepts the offer. Hence, the aggregate risk depends on whether the transaction succeeds. In this case, the buyer's payoff gain remains the same but the seller's payoff gain becomes s [ s . /] .q q/ , which explicitly depends on . As a result, we have m D f 1 .s; / rather than m D f 1 .s/ and the at part of the debt is no longer optimal. Even if s . / is off the boundaries, the seller would like to uctuate s . / to induce the buyer to acquire some information. In general, information acquisition bene ts the buyer and seller as a whole. It prevents the project to be taken when the cash ow is too low. In fact, this is a story of consulting. The seller designs a state contingent repayment to elicit information from the buyer. Their incentives are aligned rather than opposite to each other.
The second factor that drives our results is homogeneous information acquisition. That is, no state is more special than other states in terms of the dif culty of information acquisition. This property stems from rational inattention 17 and is the reason why our qualitative result does not depend on the stochastic interdependence among the underlying assets. Recall the binary decision problem in Section II, the decision maker's optimal strategy m is characterized by equation (7) 1u
The right hand side of equation (7) is the Frechet derivative 18 of information cost. It does not explicitly depends on . This is the homogeneity we referred to. As an example, homogeneity fails if we replace the term
for some non-constant function k . /. In this case, we should de ne m D f 2 .s; / instead of m D f 2 .s/ in (28). This dependence re ects the buyer's varying dif culties in discerning different states. Hence the optimal contract may not have a at part as in debt.
We use a non-homogeneous information cost to illustrate our idea. Speci cally, let 17 There are many information cost functions satisfying this property. For example, any strictly concave and symmetric function g in (1) corresponds to an information cost with this property. 18 For the readers not familiar with this concept, just think of the Frechet derivative as the gradient of the cost function. One may wonder if our results are sensitive to the allocation of bargaining power. The answer is no. This subsection introduces the case where the buyer owns bargaining power and then presents the main results. Due to the similarity between the two cases, we omit most proofs here.
Suppose the buyer proposes the contract .s . / ; q/ and the seller acquires information. Write m s;q for the seller's optimal strategy. The uninformed buyer thus enjoys expected payoff
The buyer's problem is to choose a feasible contract .s; q/ satisfying s ! 2 h 0; P N nD1 n i to maximize W .s; q/. Let .s . / ; q / denote the optimal contract for the buyer and
be the corresponding probability of trade.
PROPOSITION 6: p s ;q > 0, i.e., trade happens with positive probability.
PROOF:
See Appendix A. 
The proof is very similar to that of Proposition 3 and is omitted here.
PROPOSITION 8: If the buyer's optimal contract induces the seller to acquire information, it must be a securitized debt s ! D min P N nD1 n ; D .
The proof is very similar to that of Proposition 5 and is omitted here. Proposition 3, 5, 7 and 8 show that the optimal security is always a securitized debt, no matter who owns bargaining power.
19 This result is consistent with our previous analysis. Exchanging bargaining power does not change the facts that aggregate risk is xed and information acquisition is homogeneous.
IV. Conclusions and Discussions
This paper studies liquidity provision in presence of endogenous and exible information acquisition. In our model, there is no information asymmetry before bargaining. Also, the buyer has an expertise in acquiring information of the fundamental in the manner of rational inattention. She collects the most payoff-relevant information according to the contract proposed to her, which may endogenously generate adverse selection. Hence, the seller deliberately designs the security in order to induce the buyer to acquire information least harmful to the seller's interest. It is shown that pooling and issuing securitized debt is the uniquely optimal way to raise liquidity, regardless of the stochastic interdependence among the underlying assets and the allocation of bargaining power. Compared to the security design literature, our results are clearer. We neither restrict our attention to non-decreasing securities nor impose various assumptions on information structures like MLRP. Instead, these properties of the optimal security are justi ed in equilibrium. Our results are driven by two key factors. The one is the xed aggregate risk and the other is homogeneous information cost, without which the securitized debt may not be optimal.
The role of xed aggregate risk sheds light on a general classi cation of information, namely, to classify what information is socially valuable and what information is not. In particular, exibility enables economic agents to acquire these two types of information separately, which results in different welfare implications of information acquisition. At the level of the society, acquisition of information that is not socially valuable not only wastes social resource but also leads to endogenous adverse selection, which in turn harms social welfare. Hence, desired organizational form of the society should deter acquisition of such information. On the contrary, acquisition of socially valuable information generally increases social welfare and thus should be encouraged in principle. In our model with xed aggregate risk, none of information is socially valuable, so that securitized debt is optimal because it best deters information acquisition. On the other hand, as the example mentioned with variable aggregate risk, some certain information is socially valuable as it helps prevent investing in bad states. Consequently, acquisition of such socially valuable information should be encouraged, and thus securitized debt may not be the optimal contract. This classi cation of information also provides a new perspective to look into the mutual existence of debt and equity, both as popular forms of nancial contracts in reality. For start-ups and projects with high risk, issuing equity could be more desirable because it encourages acquisition of socially valuable information, which helps to screen projects and control the aggregate risk of the entire society. In contrast, for mature corporations with robust growth, in which the provision of liquidity is of the priority, debt could be more desirable as it deters unnecessary acquisition of information that is not socially valuable. This consideration is partly consistent with the well-known packing-order theory, and future work may further unify the lifecycle evolution of capital structure of corporations along the line of exible information acquisition.
Under a similar mentality, exibility also helps revisit the endogenous determination of capital structure in literature by specializing information acquisition. Given exible information acquisition, agents who monitor may have different incentives in acquiring different information regarding various forms of nancial contracts. Hence, different layers of nancial contracts in certain capital structure enable a specialization of information acquisition. In other words, layers of capital structure correspond to specialized layers of information to be acquired. This specialization may in turn affect production of information as well as ef ciency of monitoring, and further reshape the optimal capital structure. In this way, it is seen that exibility plays an role in determining the capital structure, and more results regarding its effects on corporate nance as well as social welfare are to be expected. Suppose m is an optimal strategy. Let " be any feasible perturbation function. The payoff from the perturbed strategy m C " is
where 2 R, and " is feasible with respect to m if 9 > 0, s.t. 8 2 2, m . /C " . / 2 [0; 1] . Then the rst order variation is
is the Frechet derivative of V . / at m. Hence the tangent hyperplane at m can be expressed as
An important observation: since V . / is a concave functional on M, V is upper bounded by any hyperplane tangent at any m 2 M, i.e., 8m; e m 2 M,
This inequality is strict when
/ is a constant almost surelyg and Pr .e m . / 6 D m . // > 0, since V . / is strictly concave on M o . We will use this observation later in this proof.
The optimality of m requires
0 for all feasible perturbation ". Hence we must have We rst search for the suf cient condition for scenario c). According to (A1), we have
Since m . ; p 1 / 2 M 1 M, the original problem is reduced to
The rst order derivative with respect to p is
In this case, J . p/ > p for p close enough to 0 and J . p/ < p for p close enough to 1. Since J . p/ is continuous, the set f p 2 .0; 1/ : J . p/ D pg is non-empty. For any
and thus m . ; p 1 / is a critical point of functional V . /. Since m . ; p 1 / 2 M o , the observation mentioned above implies
for all e m 2 M such that Pr .e m . / 6 D m . ; p 1 // > 0. Hence, V .m . ; p 1 // is strictly higher than the values achieved at any other e m 2 M, i.e., f p 2 .0; 1/ : J . p/ D pg D f p 1 g and m . ; p 1 / is the unique global maximum. This actually proves (6).
Then fA 0 ; A 1 ; A 2 g is a partition of 2n n ! 0 o . Since s . / is the optimal security, d J d Hence, h .q/ has a unique xed point q > 0. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 1.
PROOF:
Taking derivative with respect to at D 0 for both sides of (18) 
Combining the above two equations leads to (20).
Proof of Proposition 4.
We rst prove f 1 .0/ > f 2 .0/. 
Let .s; m/ be the unique intersection of f 1 .s/ and f 2 .s/. 8 ! such that P N nD1 n < s, Therefore, the optimal security is a securitized debt with face value s, i.e., s ! D min P N nD1 n ; s . It is also possible that s D 1, i.e., f 1 .s/ and f 2 .s/ never intersects. Then the optimal security By de nition, the seller's expected payoff through the optimal contract is W .s ; q / W .s; q/ > 0. This directly implies p s ;q > 0 since p s ;q D 0 always generates zero expected payoff to the buyer.
